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Abstract.  This article considers the social construction of recommendations for personnel security in the 
context of a global cyberworld. 
 
Even after an intensive exploration of human personality and the essence of personnel security, one still 
must be ready to accept the notion that recommendations for optimal personnel security contains the 
seeds of its own self-contradiction. 
 
Part of the problem stems from the context of an ever-changing world within which there are ever-
changing people.  Even if one could stop the ever-changing aspects of world and people for an instant 
and accurately embrace that essential moment so as to constitute personnel security recommendations, 
those recommendations would be but a fleeting Truth that would dissipate even as language describing 
that Truth were being for the first time recorded for the putative benefit of others. 
 
Part of the problem stems from the basic stance of alienation that persons as personnel necessarily 
experience within any organization or social context.  The assumption that one could conquer or render 
impotent through some sort of personnel security program the basic psychological and social 
contradictions of life or intrinsic, tragic elements of some non-verbal and massive Untruth that looms 
behind what is traditionally conceived of as language may the essence of hubris that all but invites the 
problematic behaviors of sabotage, espionage, and terrorism that have concerned us. 
 
It may well be that the quests for personnel security recommendations and for effecting such 
recommendations are only a vehicle to blame and exploit persons as personnel for being persons.  Or, 
perhaps, these quests exemplify the false consciousness of personnel security authorities whose very 
sincerity in their efforts display their own misunderstanding psychological and social forces impinging 
and impacting on themselves.  Nevertheless, let's look at a few common personnel security 
recommendations for what they might offer and how they might be contemplated. 
 
Recommendation 1.  Trust No One.  This recommendation might seem at odds with the rationale of 
many personnel security programs that seek to effect trust in each person, between and among people, 
or among all people towards some external object-e.g., God, the organization, the organizational motto-
that is insistently idealized so as to be identified, internalized, incorporated, introjected, or complied 
with.  In fact, one might argue that by trusting no one and communicating this personnel security 
stance, one only constructs expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies leading to organizational security 
self-constructed wounds. 
 
Of course, a counter to this argument is that the operationalized perspective of trusting no one activates 
reactance-a motivating tendency to act contrary to expectations.  In such a case, publicizing and 
operating on a non-trusting stance would be expected to induce trustworthy behavior to spite the 
organization, as opposed to protect it.  The problem here is that such contrariness then becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy and that reactance then leads to the contrariness of acting contrary to the new-self-
fulfilling prophecy-i.e., acting against the interests of organizational security-in a never-ending dialectic 
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that oscillates back and forth from trustworthy to nontrustworthy behavior as opposed to progressing 
towards some ultimate security Nirvana. 
 
The fact remains that given the personality perspective that persons as personnel present an a priori 
security vulnerability, one must assume that all people-regardless of selection process-are security 
threats.  All people will think, feel, be motivated, and act in a manner that is not in the best interest of 
the organization whose security is the primary concern-even if they think that they do have this primary 
concern. 
 
As some sort of saving grace, one should also note that people as personnel certainly differ within the 
organization in terms of quantity and quality of security risk.  And given the omnipresent security reality 
of finite security resources, one does not have the choice of treating all people equally and at adequate 
depth.  So, in essence, while no one should be trusted, some people should be distrusted more than 
others, and all people should be distrusted differently than others.  This observation leads to the next 
recommendation. 
 
Recommendation 2.  Distrust Everyone Differently.  As alluded to by many personality theorists and 
implied by still others who are not involved in such alluding, the construct of personality suggests that 
all people are like all other people in some ways, like some other people in some ways, and like no other 
people in some ways.  All people also have unique ways of being like some other people in terms of all 
possible combinations of ways and other people.  As well, all people have unique ways of manifesting 
combinations of being like all, some, and no others. 
 
Concrete examples of these abstractions can be identified in the self-reports and accompanying 
investigative analyses related to why people as personnel engage in sabotage, espionage, and terrorism.  
The usual suspects of motivations include money, ideology, some perceived slight at the hands of the 
organization or some other entity represented by the organization, searches for meaning in and control 
of one's life, sensation seeking, overcompensation for feelings of inferiority, exploitation and coercion 
by other people, and engaging in de facto mindlessness-this last characterized by not realizing that the 
behavior engaged in is problematic and constitutes some combination of sabotage, espionage, and 
terrorism. 
 
However, although each of these classes of motivation-and others too statistically deviant, unspeakable, 
or unknown to be mentioned-can be populated by persons as personnel who have engaged in 
problematic behavior, each person is a unique case.  As just one example, each person has a different 
stance and take on what money means, how much is needed over what schedule, the degree of a sense 
of entitlement, what will be done with the money, beliefs about money serving as a motivational vehicle 
for problematic behavior, and so on.  As another example, each person may represent a combination of 
motivations-none of which are sufficient and only some of which may be necessary. 
 
The epistemological Issue for personnel security experts then becomes how does one know what needs 
to be distrusted in each person as personnel and how can one best monitor what needs to be distrusted.  
The "same-size-fits- all" approach to personnel security is analogous to the random and mindless 
security screening of passengers at airports wherein every fifth or ninth person is stopped for additional 
attention-an approach that does no more than throw in the towel on any putative value of human 
intelligence unless randomness would actually correspond to the Way of the World.  Until such a 
"surgical strike" or profiling approach can be developed, implemented, and evaluated on a continuous 
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basis founded on the ever-changing world and the people within it, only luck, Fate, and forces beyond 
human comprehension will be the source of personnel security success. 
 
Recommendation 3.  Remember What's Important.  Too often, persons as personnel with authority 
make decisions about the lives of persons as personnel based on "making a point."  The "point" may be 
that persons as personnel with authority must be obeyed; that an organization and its constituents-e.g., 
the personnel life-is more important than a person's personal life.  Or the "point" may be that a policy 
manual must be followed in some special variant of a very strict constructionist perspective.  The point 
may even be unconscious in that the criterion for making decisions about the lives of persons as 
personnel (of which the person as personnel with authority is unaware) is the best resolution of 
unconscious psychodynamic conflict of that person with authority-even as that conflict may have largely 
precipitated whatever personnel Issue crystallized as crisis and as requiring some sort of decision and 
action. 
 
From a personnel security perspective, however, what's really important is what will prevent, minimize, 
or manage problematic behavior and associated noxious consequences.  So along with matters of 
substantive, procedural, and distributive justice comes the security potential not of persons as 
personnel but of the very security decisions for the organization.  This potential should be factored into 
job assignments, transfers, lay-offs, promotions, awards, firings and latest organizationally constructed 
and totalitarian-like scandal mongering. 
 
Recommendation 4.  Only Protect What Needs To be Protected.  Three enemies of personnel security 
are classification inconsistency, overclassification, and underclassification.  (Here, classification can apply 
to actual security classifications-e.g., Top Secret-classification of information as sensitive or requiring 
some sort of special access, or classification as to what constitutes a need-to-know.)  Inconsistency, 
overclassification, and underclassification are largely personality-driven in terms of idiosyncratic 
perceptions of what an organization values as appropriate classification, of unconscious psychodynamic 
conflict concerning secrecy and power, and of primitive and quantitative aphorisms about more or less 
being better regarding "good security."  These personnel security enemies can result in a disrespect for 
the rule of law and regulations, lowered motivation for following the letter and the spirit of laws and 
regulations, and actual decrements in behavioral compliance with laws and regulations. 
 
Conclusion.  The upshot of an exploration of optimal security recommendations is that personnel 
security authorities need to be engaged not in Truth detection but in a never-ending dialogue within 
themselves, among members of the organization, and the persons and world in which an organization is 
situated.  The ever-expanding cyber context makes this dialogue evermore complex but evermore 
demanding.  Multiple selves, disguised personas, and cyber-produced psychological and social change all 
contribute to the challenge of personnel security and identifying the remaining robustness of anything 
that might constitute the timelessness of human psychology and behavior.  Such a conclusion may only 
anger the personnel security authorities of today who long for and demand certainty and consider 
ambiguity as moral, ethical, and even psychological weakness.  However, it is our fate that it is only 
ambiguity that we can be certain of.  (See DiBattista, R.A.  (1996).  Forecasting sabotage events in the 
workplace. Public Personnel Management, 25, 41-52; DiBattista, R.A.  (1991).  Creating new approaches 
to recognize and deter sabotage. Public Personnel Management, 20, 347-352; Klein, R. L.; Leong, G. B.; & 
Silva, J. A.  (1996). Employee sabotage in the workplace: A biopsychosocial model.   Journal of Forensic 
Sciences, 41, 52-55; Sieh, E.W. (1987). Garment workers: Perceptions of inequity and employee theft.  
British Journal of Criminology, 27, 174-190; Tucker, J.  (1993). Everyday forms of employee resistance. 
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Sociological Forum, 8, 25-45.) (Keywords: Espionage, Personality, Personnel Security, Sabotage, 
Terrorism.) 
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